We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Like any trade activity, migration tends to generate gains to all parties involved - the migrants as well as the native-born population. With a mal-functioning labour market, however, migration will exacerbate the imperfections in the market. Consequently, it may lead to losses to the...

The objective of this paper is to highlight the importance of the ‘public finance’ impact of international migration on wages and welfare. To this end, we construct a general equilibrium model of a labour-exporting (source) and a labour-importing (host) country with identical consumers,...

Direct democracy with its use of referenda avoids the prototypical principal-agent problems of delegation in indirect democracies, especially since elected representatives are usually not committed by law to keep their promises. Sequential or more complex referenda may, however, result in an...

This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good...