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A Nationwide Laboratory Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioural Experiments into Representative Surveys

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Schupp, Jürgen; von … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

data with representative behavioural data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to … elicit people’s trust correlate well with behaviourally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661984

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Karlan, Dean S.; List, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior … the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated … than not identifying the name of the matching donor. The first experiment demonstrates that the matching grant condition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084090

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247882

Public Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy

Gueth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Pantz, Katinka; Sutter, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

Direct democracy with its use of referenda avoids the prototypical principal-agent problems of delegation in indirect democracies, especially since elected representatives are usually not committed by law to keep their promises. Sequential or more complex referenda may, however, result in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252203

Choosing to Compete: How different are girls and boys?

Booth, Alison L; Nolen, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Using a controlled experiment, we examine the role of nurture in explaining the stylized fact that women shy away from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082535

The excess burden of tax evasion – An experimental detection-concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph-C; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities, investing costly effort in concealment, respectively detect ion, of tax evasion. We show that (socially inefficient) efforts depend positively on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824115

Tournaments for the endogenous allocating of prizes within workteams - Theory and experimental evidence

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

proposer rotates in the order of members' efforts. We show in an experiment that tournaments elicit higher efforts than random …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765090

Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining

Brosig, Jeannette; Ockenfels, Axel; Weimann, Joachim - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic pre-play communication (no, one-way, and two-way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargaining out-comes are influenced by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765095