We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

Débat du pouvoir et des finalités des marchés financiers et plaide pour une réhabilitation de la politique qui peut constituer un contrepoids.

L'auteur tente de montrer que les menaces réelles liées à la mondialisation peuvent être évitées si la politique économique reconnaît dans le social une composante essentielle de l'efficacité économique.

Pour faire en sorte que le progrès social ne reste pas en panne, la politique doit imposer sa loi aux marchés financiers même si ceux-ci sont indispensables au fonctionnement de l'économie française en aidant à répartir la masse des risques. L'échec de la gauche en France s'explique...

We propose a model in which better governance incentivizes managers to perform better and thus saves on the cost of providing pay for performance. However, when managerial talent is scarce, firms' competition to attract better managers reduces an individual firm's incentives to invest in...

We present a simple model of systemic risk and we show that each financial institution's contribution to systemic risk can be measured as its systemic expected shortfall (SES), i.e., its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized. SES increases with the...

We propose a new method to model hedge fund risk exposures using relatively high frequency conditioning variables. In a large sample of funds, we find substantial evidence that hedge fund risk exposures vary across and within months, and that capturing within-month variation is more important...

We propose a new method to capture changes in hedge funds' exposures to risk factors, exploiting information from relatively high frequency conditioning variables. Using a consolidated database of nearly 15,000 individual hedge funds between 1994 and 2009, we find substantial evidence that hedge...

We examine deal-level data on private equity transactions in the UK initiated during the period 1996 to 2004 by mature private equity houses. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for (un-levered) return to quoted peers to extract a measure of "alpha" or abnormal performance of the...

This paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of hedge funds on asset markets. We construct a simple measure of the aggregate illiquidity of hedge fund portfolios, and show that it has strong in- and out-of-sample forecasting power for 72 portfolios of international equities, corporate...