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potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … the degree of competition between suppliers, as well as other more practical indirect ways to stimulate innovation. We … discuss the effects of standard setting activities by large, often public, procurers on innovation races. We evaluate how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875
An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016
Frequently, aspiring entrants have only limited information about their potential rivals’ entry decisions. As a result, the outcome of the entry game may be that more firms enter than the market can sustain; or, at least, that unnecessary entry investments are made. We refer to these outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662244
paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage … innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive …&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784763
firm's incentives for R&D. These changes influence the probability of innovation through two effects: changes in total R … shift from the rival firm to the dominant firm is a good thing as it decreases the likelihood of duplicate innovation (we … rights are strong. That is, firm dominance is good for innovation when (but only when) property rights are strong. We also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789049
An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497972
We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504700
We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477
R&D alliances (Research Joint Ventures or other institutional forms) normally involve repeated, non-contractible actions (investments in R&D), and uncertainty regarding both success and the termination date. Accordingly, we model these agreements as equilibria of infinite-period supergames. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136561
This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951