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Perotti, Enrico C; Ratnovski, Lev; Vlahu, Razvan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246611

Perotti, Enrico C; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662100

Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail?

Perotti, Enrico C; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure, by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792492

Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Financing in Russian FIG

Gelfer, Stanislav; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

possibility of private appropriation of value. We then distinguish between bank-led groups, which are more hierarchical, and … industry-led group firms (unlike in independent firms), while the negative correlation is entirely due to bank-led group firms … sensitivity of group firms' investment to Q is entirely to be attributed to firms in bank-led groups, where the controlling bank …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123859

The Political Origin of Pension Funding

Perotti, Enrico C; Schwienbacher, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding, shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after the Great Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden (2006), large inflationary shocks due to war damage devastated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504507

Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque, while shareholder-run firms prefer more … transparency. We can predict a clustering of attributes: bank dominance, established firms with valuable investment, but also … equity-controlled firms. Finally, bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656269

Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

make full use of the strategic advantage of a strong firm. We show that bank-controlled firms will tend to discourage … that bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114392

Insecure Debt

Matta, Rafael; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Does demand for safety create instability ? Secured (repo) funding can be made so safe that it never runs, but shifts risk to unsecured creditors. We show that this triggers more frequent runs by unsecured creditors, even in the absence of fundamental risk. This effect is separate from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207395

A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation

Perotti, Enrico C; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative merit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation. When banks differ in credit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854517