Showing 1 - 6 of 6
We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025511
We study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246599
We use survey data to study American households’ propensity to default when the value of their mortgage exceeds the value of their house even if they can afford to pay their mortgage (strategic default). We find that 26% of the existing defaults are strategic. We also find that no household...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005039578
We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever U.S. Government intervention in the financial sector announced the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $131 billion at a taxpayers’cost of $25 -$47 billions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567799
, even ignoring interconnectedness issues, the failure of a bank causes a larger welfare loss than the failure of other … optimal fiscal response to such a shock is to help people, not banks, and the size of this response should be larger if a bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084676
We study the role of fiscal policy in a complete markets model where the only friction is the non-pledgeability of human capital. We show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient, leading to too little risky investment. We also show that fiscal policy following a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084716