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Agency Conflicts, Investment and Asset Pricing

Albuquerque, Rui; Wang, Neng - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497980

The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An inherent difficulty in valuing controlling blocks of shares is the illiquidity of the market. We explore the pricing implications associated with the illiquidity of controlling blocks of shares in the context of a search model of block trades. The model considers several dimensions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084025

Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913

Flandreau, Marc; Zendejas, Flores; Huitzilihuitl, Juan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554223

Black Man’s Burden: Measured Philanthropy in the British Empire, 1880-1913

Accominotti, Olivier; Flandreau, Marc; Rezzik, Riad; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Ferguson and Schularick (2006) recently provided a measure of the effect of Empire subjection on borrowing countries’ interest rates. They find this effect to be large and significant, ranging between 80 to 180 basis points. We argue that their methodology is inadequate and that their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666472

Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

remedies that were commonly applied one century ago and find that the international financial world was fairly similar to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791208

Monetary Union, Trade Integration, and Business Cycles in 19th Century Europe: Just Do It

Flandreau, Marc; Maurel, Mathilde - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper seeks to trace the impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation, focusing on Europe in the late 19th century period as a guide for modern debates. For this purpose, we first estimate a gravity model and show that monetary arrangements were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791820

Caveat Emptor: Coping With Sovereign Risk Without the Multilaterals

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies how private banks dealt with sovereign risk before World War I. At that time there was no … period into the largest international bank in a country that was the second largest world creditor. In 1871, Crédit Lyonnais … it operated before World War I: given the prominence of Crédit Lyonnais on the international scene, its perceptions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656319

Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969131

Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Note: A substantially revised version of this paper has been published as CEPR DP7358, "Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades." Please refer to DP7358 for the most up-to-date version. We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136458

CEO Power, Compensation and Governance

Albuquerque, Rui; Miao, Jianjun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favour one or the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656247