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Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717

Does the Stock Market Harm Investment Incentives?

Asker, John; Farre-Mensa, Joan; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine whether stock market-listed firms in the U.S. invest suboptimally due to agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control. We derive testable predictions to distinguish between underinvestment due to rational “short-termism” and overinvestment due to “empire...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468621

State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise

Chen, Donghua; Jiang, Dequan; Ljungqvist, Alexander P.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We study the efficiency of internal capital markets at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital flows, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168893

Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance

Jenkinson, Tim; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667086

Liquidity and Governance

Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717

Black Man’s Burden: Measured Philanthropy in the British Empire, 1880-1913

Accominotti, Olivier; Flandreau, Marc; Rezzik, Riad; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Ferguson and Schularick (2006) recently provided a measure of the effect of Empire subjection on borrowing countries’ interest rates. They find this effect to be large and significant, ranging between 80 to 180 basis points. We argue that their methodology is inadequate and that their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666472

Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

remedies that were commonly applied one century ago and find that the international financial world was fairly similar to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791208

Monetary Union, Trade Integration, and Business Cycles in 19th Century Europe: Just Do It

Flandreau, Marc; Maurel, Mathilde - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper seeks to trace the impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation, focusing on Europe in the late 19th century period as a guide for modern debates. For this purpose, we first estimate a gravity model and show that monetary arrangements were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791820

Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913

Flandreau, Marc; Zendejas, Flores; Huitzilihuitl, Juan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554223

Caveat Emptor: Coping With Sovereign Risk Without the Multilaterals

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies how private banks dealt with sovereign risk before World War I. At that time there was no … period into the largest international bank in a country that was the second largest world creditor. In 1871, Crédit Lyonnais … it operated before World War I: given the prominence of Crédit Lyonnais on the international scene, its perceptions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656319