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Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans

Almazan, Andres; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498142

Optimal Corporate Governance Structures

Almazan, Andres; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make investments that improve the effectiveness of the firm organization under his management interacts with the replacement policy of the board of directors. We characterize the optimal compensation package (including severance pay) under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123708

Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913

Flandreau, Marc; Zendejas, Flores; Huitzilihuitl, Juan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554223

Black Man’s Burden: Measured Philanthropy in the British Empire, 1880-1913

Accominotti, Olivier; Flandreau, Marc; Rezzik, Riad; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Ferguson and Schularick (2006) recently provided a measure of the effect of Empire subjection on borrowing countries’ interest rates. They find this effect to be large and significant, ranging between 80 to 180 basis points. We argue that their methodology is inadequate and that their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666472

Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International Financial Architecture

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

remedies that were commonly applied one century ago and find that the international financial world was fairly similar to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791208

Monetary Union, Trade Integration, and Business Cycles in 19th Century Europe: Just Do It

Flandreau, Marc; Maurel, Mathilde - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper seeks to trace the impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation, focusing on Europe in the late 19th century period as a guide for modern debates. For this purpose, we first estimate a gravity model and show that monetary arrangements were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791820

Caveat Emptor: Coping With Sovereign Risk Without the Multilaterals

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies how private banks dealt with sovereign risk before World War I. At that time there was no … period into the largest international bank in a country that was the second largest world creditor. In 1871, Crédit Lyonnais … it operated before World War I: given the prominence of Crédit Lyonnais on the international scene, its perceptions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656319

The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France

Bignon, Vincent; Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083663

Financing and the Protection of Innovators

Llobet, Gerard; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The protection that innovators obtain through intellectual property rights crucially depends on their incentives and ability to litigate infringers. Taking patents as a notable example, we study how the financing of legal costs can alter the incentives to litigate in defence of a patent and,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504368

Liquidity shocks, roll-over risk and debt maturity

Segura, Anatoli; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We develop an infinite horizon model of an economy in which banks finance long term assets by placing non-tradable debt among savers. Banks choose the overall principal, interest rate, and maturity of their debt taking into account two opposite forces: (i) investors' preference for short...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921772