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Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Globalization and Cooperative Relations

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

reciprocal exchange to lifetime employment, from relational governance to corruption/collusion. We study how agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136656

Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B

Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Contracts often reward inefficient tasks and are not enforced ex post. We provide a new explanation based on the relationship between explicit contracts and implicit agreements, distinguishing the ex-ante decision to sign a contract from the ex-post decision whether to apply it. We show that it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854495

Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks

Frisell, Lars; Roszbach, Kasper F.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent research on central bank governance has focused mainly on their monetary policy task. As the sub-prime loan … also in ensuring their soundness and stability. In this paper we study the specific corporate governance structures of a … public governance literatures, where present. Our analysis highlights a striking variety in central bank governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656403

Networks of Relations and Social Capital

Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114333

Legalizing Bribe Giving

Dufwenberg, Martin; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083969

The Trading Potential of Eastern Europe

Wang, Zhen Kun; Winters, L. Alan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1991

This paper fits a gravity model to the trade of 76 market economies. It then applies the model to data on East European economies to estimate what their trading potential might have been, had behaved like market economies in the mid-1980s. At existing levels of national income, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662085

What's Behind Mercosur's CET?

Olarreaga, Marcelo; Soloaga, Isidro; Winters, L. Alan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The theoretical literature follows two different approaches to explain the endogenous formation of a Customs Union (CU). The first one explains CU formation through the willingness of integrating partners to exploit terms-of-trade effects. Indeed, as the union forms, the 'domestic market' gets...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666986

How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR

Chang, Won; Winters, L. Alan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The welfare effects of PTAs are most directly linked to changes in trade prices, i.e., the terms of trade. This paper employs a simple strategic pricing game in segmented markets to measure the effects of MERCOSUR on the pricing of 'non-member' exports to the region. Working with detailed data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789012

The EC and World Protectionism: Dimensions of the Political Economy

Winters, L. Alan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

This paper appraises the arguments that the creation of the EC has increased world protectionism <MI>relative to what it would otherwise have been<D>. Models of tariff bargaining between trade blocs suggest some increase, because the optimum tariff is higher for larger blocs, but this is not...</d></mi>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791325