Showing 1 - 8 of 8
This paper extends the work of Barro and Gordon (1983) to general linear models with rational expectations. We examine the question whether the optimal policy rule, i.e. the one that a government which could pre-commit itself would use, can be sustained as a consistent rule in the sense defined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504552
In several recent papers macroeconomic policy has been modelled in the context of a game of incomplete information. A central result of the work by Backus and Driffill and by Barro is that the uncertainty may provide an incentive for the government to maintain a socially efficient policy of zero...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504603
A classical equilibrium model is analysed of two interdependent monetary economies in which it is assumed that cash is the only asset, and which is characterized by perfect foresight, flexible exchange rates and imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods. The first-best optimum sets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504695
The paper investigates the sustainability of cooperative rules for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in a two-country world. The problem is set out as a supergame in which the threat strategy is to switch to a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. A number of possible non-cooperative equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281334
This paper proposes and applies to the London Business School (LBS) model a general methodology for the design of macroeconomic policy using large rational expectations models. Design proceeds through the following four stages: first, a small, linear representation of the original large,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666971
If private sector agents hold rational expectations, they will predict any future policy switches. Discounting the announced optimal policies, if they are not credible, will lead to a response which deprives the government of any incentive to renege on previous announcements and of the benefits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788898
This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment. In a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing, the optimal first-period subsidy is lower if firms cannot precommit to future output than if they can; and is lower still if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661773
This paper provides a general review of recent developments in the application of control theory to macroeconomic policy design. It starts by highlighting the crucial difference between the engineering and economic control problem, in that the latter, unlike the former, is concerned with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791518