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The Stability Threshold and Two Facts of Polarization

Haimanko, Ori; Le Breton, Michel; Weber, Shlomo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

prevent credible secession threats by regions of the country. Severity of internal tension has been linked to degree of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123952

The Logic of Compromise: Monetary bargaining in Austria-Hungary 1867-1913

Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper examines the historical record of the Austro-Hungarian monetary union, focusing on its bargaining dimension. As a result of the 1867 Compromise, Austria and Hungary shared a common currency, although they were fiscally sovereign and independent entities. By using repeated threats to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136457

Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity

Desmet, Klaus; Le Breton, Michel; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

determining the likelihood of secession and unification. We provide empirical support for choosing genetic distances as a proxy of … the regions prone to secession and the countries that are more likely to merge. Our framework is further applied to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136479

The Economics of Secession – Analysing the economic impact of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia

Rodriguez-Pose, Andres; Stermsek, Marko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

This paper looks at the economic impact of secession through the lens of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia … there has been no favourable economic impact of secession and that how secession was achieved is key in understanding the … subsequent economic performance of the newly independent countries. In cases of secession without conflict, independence did not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083216

Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase

Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

as in the academic realm. A frequently made point is that allowing free secession may protect the minority’s interests … unattractive for the minority region. In contrast, limiting the secession possibilities by requiring the consent of a majority of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788882

Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making

Anwar, Shamena; Bayer, Patrick; Hjalmarsson, Randi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper uses data from the Gothenburg District Court in Sweden and a research design that exploits the random assignment of politically appointed jurors (termed nämndemän) to make three contributions to the literature on jury decision-making: (i) an assessment of whether systematic biases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276386

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

Bénabou, Roland; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We analyze the joint dynamics of religious beliefs, scientific progress and coalitional politics along both religious …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262883

Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alesina, Alberto F; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This Paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non-elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable for tasks that do not involve too much specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123948

Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1991

Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. In a society where distributional conflict is important, political decisions are likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to activities which promote growth, such as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124104

Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

Inspired by current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a `federation' of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136444