We model a situation where the entrepreneur has an informational advantage during the early stages of an investment project while the venture capitalist has the informational advantage during the later stages. We examine how this evolution of informational asymmetry affects venture investment...

Commercial bank debts of developing countries are held by a heterogenous group of banks. Here we focus on the distinction between large international money-centre banks and smaller domestic banks. In particular we investigate the role of debt concentration – the amount of a country’s debt...

Countries can repeatedly and opportunistically renegotiate the terms of agreements to which they can only complicitly assent. Therefore, when attempting to coordinate exchange rate policies, they continuously play partnership games. We develop a reduced form model of exchange rate management...

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of firm-level bargaining, along the lines of Manning (1993). In this context, we provide a firm level wage equation that explicitly accounts for firm heterogeneity. This wage equation explains inter-firm wage differentials by differences in labour...

This paper develops a simple theoretical model that can be implemented to estimate the willingness to pay for distributive justice. We derive a formula that allows one to recover the willingness to pay for distributive justice from the estimated coefficients of a probit regression and fiscal...

This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation...