Showing 1 - 10 of 14
I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788985
The purpose of this paper is to suggest how institutions can be created and modified to devise and implement industrial policy in the emerging market economies. Two main issues confronting industrial policy institutions are how to avoid regulatory capture, that is, having those policy-makers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791806
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
Academics' view of the benefits of finance vastly exceeds societal perception. This dissonance is at least partly explained by an under-appreciation by academia of how, without proper rules, finance can easily degenerate into a rent-seeking activity. I outline what finance academics can do, from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145481
The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The latter are defined by the following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114275
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don’t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666705
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251
This paper analyses how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented. Political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124016
This Paper studies the relationship between civil war and private investment in a poor, resource abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining firms and conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conflict, marked by the death of the rebel movement leader...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067422
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969