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Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747

Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

greatly exacerbated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to airwaves auctions and takeover battles …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792017

Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498113

The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114197

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514

Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We study a two-stage sequential search model with two agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities are private information and they are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage the designer chooses an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276381

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