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Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797

Cartels Uncovered

Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists in an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468608

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases

Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666424

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124138

Efficient Tuition & Fees, Examinations and Subsidies

Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

A student's future log-wage is given by the sum of a skill premium and a random personal ‘ability’ term. Students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. We assume first that universities are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136530

To Reveal or Not to Reveal - The Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Rosenkranz, Stephanie - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

technological know-how is private information. Firms first decide on cooperation and information revelation and then compete for a … patent. Provided that spillovers exist in the case of unilateral revelation of know-how, it can be shown that non-cooperation … equilibrium is unique for high spillovers. Cooperation can occur for low spillovers. For certain parameters there exists an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504335

The Informational Role of the Business Cycle

Dellas, Harris - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Economic decisions such as occupational and entrepreneurial choices may violate true comparative advantage when economic agents are uncertain about which activity best matches their talents. If relative performance varies over the business cycle (for instance, if downturns affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504434

On Robust Constitution Design

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542

Austerity

Dellas, Harris; Niepelt, Dirk - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We shed light on the function, properties and optimal size of austerity using the standard sovereign model augmented to include incomplete information about credit risk. Austerity is defined as the shortfall of consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145392

Rogoff's 'Conservative' Central Banker Restored

Herrendorf, Berthold; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper shows that delegation of monetary policy to a weight-conservative central banker is optimal, although the government can also use an inflation contract, an employment target, an inflation target, or any combination of these, to control the central banker. The key feature of our model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114158