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Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading

Acemoglu, Daron; Simsek, Alp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A 'folk theorem' originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria are always or 'generically' inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper critically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468520

Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms

Müller, Andreas; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

. Markets for state-contingent debt alone do not restore efficiency. The constrained optimum can be implemented by a flexible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276380

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231

Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468559

Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics

Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This research shows that moral hazard associated with extant social insurance arrangements causes underinvestment in human capital, because of government’s inability to commit to welfare policies. It then argues that education policies, such as education subsidies or direct public investment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468672

World Finance and the US 'New Economy': Risk Sharing and Risk Exposure

Miller, Marcus; Zhang, Lei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The promising prospect of a ‘New Economy’ in the US attracted substantial equity inflows in the late 1990s, helping to finance the country’s burgeoning current account deficit. After peaking in 2000, however, US stocks fell by some 8 trillion dollars in value. To assess the welfare effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123520

Capital Redistribution and the Market Allocation of Firm-Ownership

Grüner, Hans Peter; Schils, Ruediger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper studies the relationship between political wealth redistribution and the allocation of firm-ownership when production requires an unobservable input. The economy's wealth distribution affects the equilibrium interest rate and the allocation of entrepreneurial rents because wealth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123568

Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

Public Disclosure and Bank Failures

Cordella, Tito; Levy Yeyati, Eduardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper analyses the impact of public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure on banks’ risk taking incentives and its implications in terms of soundness of the banking system. We find that, when banks have a complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123714

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