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Macroeconomics after the crisis – hedgehog or fox?

Miller, Marcus; Zhang, Lei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

‘pecuniary externalities’. Two that affect borrowers and lenders balance sheets in pro-cyclical fashion are described, along with … measures that might help curb their destabilising effects. These ‘pecuniary externalities’ can be thought of as the unintended … Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) – that when externalities are present, leaving things to the market may not be ‘constrained Pareto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083632

Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms

Müller, Andreas; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Motivated the European debt crisis, we construct a tractable theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276380

Bank Solvency, Market Structure, and Monitoring Incentives

Caminal, Ramon; Matutes, Carmen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We analyse the impact of market structure on the probability of banking failure when banks’ loan portfolios are subject to aggregate uncertainty. In our model borrowers are subject to a moral hazard problem, which induces banks to choose between two second-best alternative devices: costly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662062

An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662347

Tax Policy, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship

Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Soren Bo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

The Paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high-risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide equity finance. They must structure the entrepreneur’s profit share and base salary to assure their incentives for full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666436

Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence From The Subprime Mortgage Market

DellAriccia, Giovanni; Igan, Deniz; Laeven, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper studies the relationship between the recent boom and current delinquencies in the subprime mortgage market. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which this relationship can be explained by a decrease in lending standards that is unrelated to improvements in underlying economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666586

Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort

Engellandt, Axel; Riphahn, Regina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide ‘stepping stones’ into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666640

Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043

Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles

Meyer, Margaret A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

We study the design of a sequence of two contests between a pair of identical risk averse employees whose effort choices are private information. It is optimal for the organization to `bias' the second contest in favor of the early winner - the reduction in second-period incentives is outweighed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667058

Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System

Gale, Douglas M; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788955

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