We study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanims in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a...

We study how competition from privately-supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if ‘inside monies’ can...

The paper identifies the potential sources of allocative inefficiency generated by the Multi-Fiber Agreements (MFA) and examines the evidence for such inefficiencies. Five sources of inefficiency are identified relating to inefficient allocations across countries, across consumers, and among...

We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism....

We present a method for identifying and estimating the gains from trade in limit order markets and provide new empirical evidence that the limit order market is a good market design. The gains from trade in our model arise because traders have different valuations for the stock. We use...

This article develops a multi-period production model to examine the optimal dynamic behaviour of a large monopolistic value-maximizing firm that manipulates its valuation as well as the price of its output. In the pre-commitment equilibrium the firm’s output and labour demand are decreased,...

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid...

This paper studies dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other’s purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information increases...