The Paper takes a first look at the host and home country effects of German foreign direct investment (FDI) in Eastern Europe based on new survey data of 1050 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 420 German multinationals during the 1990s. We find that German investors transfer a substantial...

I analyse the effects of competition on R&D effort (in a non-tournament context) and obtain robust results that hold for a variety of market structures, including markets with and without barriers to entry and markets characterized by either price or quantity competition. The approach...

We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...

Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...

This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...

This paper interprets the existing evidence on enterprise restructuring in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Despite differences in restructuring policies, the pattern of observed restructuring appears similar in the three countries. Contrary to initial expectations, managers of SOEs have...

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power’ approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between...

We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a general equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compensation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many...