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Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory … at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention … politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498113

Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the … critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747

Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We use a classroom game, the ‘Wallet Game’, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792017

Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157

The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114197