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We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114197
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory … at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention … politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003
The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498113
We use a classroom game, the ‘Wallet Game’, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792017
in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the … critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747
discretionary efforts are more likely to arise when competition within a sector is high. Competition mitigates incentives for free … non-monotonic relationship between competition and job security, and predicts patterns for a number of other variables …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973968
Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976792