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How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Karlan, Dean S.; List, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We develop a simple theory which formally describes how charities can resolve the information asymmetry problems faced …-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior … the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084090

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Early Retirement Behaviour in the Netherlands - Evidence from a Policy Reform

Euwals, Rob; van Vuuren, Daniel; Wolthoff, Ronald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

In the early 1990s, the Dutch social partners agreed upon transforming the generous and actuarially unfair PAYG early retirement schemes into less generous and actuarially fair capital funded schemes. The starting dates of the transitional arrangements varied by industry sector. In this study,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792155

A Direct Test of the Buffer Stock Model of Saving

Jappelli, Tullio; Padula, Mario; Pistaferri, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Recent models with liquidity constraints and impatience emphasize that consumers use savings to buffer income fluctuations. When wealth is below an optimal target, consumers try to increase their buffer stock of wealth by saving more. When it is above target, they increase consumption. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504459

On the Global Supply of Basic Research

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

In a two-country Schumpeterian growth model, we study the incentives for basic research investments by governments in a globalized world. We find that a country's basic research investments increase with the country's level of human capital and decline with its own market size. This may explain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145469

Making Democracy Work: Culture, Social Capital and Elections in China

Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy; Xu, Yiqing; Yao, Yang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper aims to show that culture is an important determinant of the effectiveness of formal democratic institutions, such as elections. We collect new data to document the presence of voluntary and social organizations and the history of electoral reforms in Chinese villages. We use the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213313

Diversity and the Power of the Elites in Democratic Societies: A model and a test.

Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor- agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611020

Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China

Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001062

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