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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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The Market for Corporate Law
Bar-Gill, Oren; Barzuza, Michal; Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. The analysis provides a full characterization of the equilibrium in this market. Competition among states is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114390
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Corporate Governance
Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666704
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841
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Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder protection affects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder … and small shareholders. Moreover, strengthening legal minority shareholder protection may have adverse effects on the … shareholders, e.g., equal treatment rules, can be detrimental. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105