Similar Search Results

The Allocation of European Union Allowances. Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo; Ellerman, A Denny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme … lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme … allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667060

Optimal Capital Allocation Using RAROC And EVA

Stoughton, Neal; Zechner, Josef - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper analyzes financial institutions' capital allocation decisions when their required equity capital depends on … can be delegated through an economic value added (EVA) compensation contract and solve for the optimal capital allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661956

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the principal trades off ex post efficiency in the bad state of nature against a larger profit in the good state of nature. We report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080