We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....

This paper documents evidence consistent with informed trading by individual investors around earnings announcements using a unique dataset of NYSE stocks. We show that intense aggregate individual investor buying (selling) predicts large positive (negative) abnormal returns on and after...

We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion regarding the timing of its release. While it is well known that firms appear to delay the release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the economy (or the industry) affects this...

This paper studies the role of wage and pension pressures in explaining the budget deficit crisis of 1991–2 after the remarkable 1990 Polish economic stabilization and liberalization. It also explains the persistence of the high tax wedge that later helped overcome the budget crisis. The...