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Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring
Grinstein, Yaniv; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signaling a sharp increase in Delaware’s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our event study, low-growth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084098
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Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing
Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking external corporate governance and auditing regulation into account. For given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792136
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The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities
Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
this separation interact with the regulation of the product market. The main issue to be addressed here is how the degree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598
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Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?
Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Renneboog, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
Economic theory points to five parties active in disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in take-overs, non-executive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This Paper reports the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124256
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Corporate Governance Externalities
Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630
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Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?
Estrin, Saul; Tian, Lihui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of China’s newly privatized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656424
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A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773
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Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
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Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks
Grossman, Richard; Imai, Masami - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals—that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145404
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312