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Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time?

Carrillo, Juan D - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper proposes a rule to determine the winner of a soccer match which is different from the traditional penalty shoot-outs at the end of extra time. We show that games can be more attractive if penalties are shot before extra time and the outcome counts only if the tie is preserved during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662167

Suspense

Chan, William M; Courty, Pascal; Li, Hao - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In a dynamic model of sports competition, we show that when spectators care only about the level of effort exerted by contestants, rewarding schemes that depend linearly on the final score difference provide more efficient incentives for efforts than schemes based only on who wins and loses....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114294

Risk Aversion and Human Capital Investment: A Structural Econometric Model

Brodaty, Thomas; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Prieto, Ana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We propose to model individual educational investments as a rational decision, maximizing expected utility, conditional on some characteristics observed by the student, under the combined risks affecting future wages and schooling duration. Assuming that students' attitudes toward risk can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123629

Estimation of Class-Size Effects, Using 'Maimonides' Rule': The Case of French Junior High Schools

Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Mahjoub, Mohamed Badrane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Using a rich sample of students from French junior high schools with a panel structure, we obtain small but significant and negative effects of class size on probabilities of educational success, in grades 6 and 7. An 8 to 10 student reduction of class size puts the child of a non-educated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123884

The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets

Crawford, Gregory S; Yurukoglu, Ali - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We measure how the bundling of television channels affects welfare. We estimate an industry model of viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct simulations of à la carte policies that require...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001064

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions

Compte, Olivier; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Verdier, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is … corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firms. This can result in high public spending and inefficient allocation … which unilateral anti-corruption controls may restore price competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662229

Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662235

The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian---as opposed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662287

Corruption and Openness

Neeman, Zvika; Paserman, M. Daniele; Simhon, Avi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption and wealth, which are co-determined in … corruption, and if indeed as suggested by a number of empirical studies corruption hampers growth, then how did rich countries … relatively closed economies of the 19th century, the gains from corruption remained inside the country and became part of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666630