Showing 1 - 3 of 3
This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make investments that improve the effectiveness of the firm organization under his management interacts with the replacement policy of the board of directors. We characterize the optimal compensation package (including severance pay) under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123708
Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that leads to the generation of information. Of course, transparency can improve the allocation of capital. When the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124396
This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498142