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Casella, Alessandra - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1990

When countries of different sizes participate in a cooperative agreement, the potential gain from deviation determines the minimum power that each country requires in the common decision-making. This paper studies the problem in the context of a common currency, which requires coordination of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662264

R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence

Cassiman, Bruno; Veugelers, Reinhilde - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Our results on the relationship between R&D spillovers and cooperation in R&D suggest that it is necessary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662294

The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives

Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

lead to a unique equilibrium path where external enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666501

Prisoners' Other Dilemma

Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the … parameter space, all cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We derive an … others defect, and argue it is a better measure for the ‘likelihood’ of cooperation than the critical level at which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887

Information Sharing and Cumulative Innovation in Business Networks

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

How can we explain the success of cooperative networks of firms that share innovations, such as Silicon Valley or the Open Source community? This Paper shows that if innovations are cumulative, making an invention publicly available to a network of firms may be valuable if the firm expects to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666989

Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach

Lindbeck, Assar; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1987

"). The outsiders do not underbid the insiders since, were they to do so, the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791249

Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Review

Kollintzas, Tryphon; Philippopoulos, Apostolis; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper provides a coherent, logical framework that connects the main issues concerning fiscal policy in an economic and monetary union. The focus is on normative issues within the European Union.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791296

A Theory of Reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797

Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217

Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: China and Europe Compared

Greif, Avner; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468568