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Hope, Change, and Financial Markets: Can Obama's Words Drive the Market?
Sazedj, Sharmin; Tavares, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Barack Obama’s victory in the 2009 presidential elections in the United States is widely credited to his personal charisma and his extraordinary rhetorical powers, as revealed throughout the campaign. President Obama was inaugurated in the midst of the worst economic crisis in the country,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399716
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Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?
Barros, Pedro Pita; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best … higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662069
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A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545
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Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility
Lahiri, Sajal; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
We develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility. A donor country gives aid to a recipient government for the benefit of a target group. However, the recipient government accepts political contributions from a lobby group not targeted by the donor and transfers a fraction of the aid to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667087
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How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy
List, John; Sturm, Daniel M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789133
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Safety Nets Within Banks
Felgenhauer, Mike; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We study how banks should protect their credit departments against the external influence from potential borrowers. We analyze four mechanisms that are widespread in practice: a credit board with unanimity or simple majority, a hierarchy and an advisory system. A bank faces a trade-off between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791309
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A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, Giovanni; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We develop a model where trade agreements - in addition to correcting terms-of-trade externalities - help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. We explore how trade liberalization is affected by the characteristics of the political environment, such as the degree to which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791399
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Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence
Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and … theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187
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Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination
Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
maker does not react unless all of them are actively lobbying. In a ‘mutual discipline’ or high-trust equilibrium, by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792452
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Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation
Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547