Showing 1 - 10 of 12
There is a fast growing literature that partially identifies structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) by imposing sign restrictions on the responses of a subset of the endogenous variables to a particular structural shock (sign-restricted SVARs). To date, the methods that have been used are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148879
We use available methods for testing macro models to evaluate a model of China over the period from Deng Xiaoping's reforms up until the crisis period. Bayesian ranking methods are heavily influenced by controversial priors on the degree of price/wage rigidity. When the overall models are tested...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083573
We use available methods for testing macro models to evaluate a model of China over the period from Deng Xiaoping's reforms up until the crisis period. Bayesian ranking methods are heavily influenced by controversial priors on the degree of price/wage rigidity. When the overall models are tested...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084701
This paper estimates and tests a new Keynesian small open economy model in the tradition of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003) using Bayesian estimation techniques on Swedish data. To account for the switch to an inflation targeting regime in 1993 we allow for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661438
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747
We use a classroom game, the ‘Wallet Game’, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792017
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003
The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498113