Showing 1 - 10 of 479
We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854493
We provide comprehensive analysis of the isolation program for financially distressed firms in Romania. The results indicate that the isolation program did not deliver any tangible improvements in operational performance, nor did it enhance the process of privatization or liquidation of large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666566
We conduct a theoretical and empirical investigation of the impact of bankruptcy codes on firms’ capital-structure choices. In our theoretical framework, costs of financial distress are endogenously determined as a function of the bankruptcy code. Anticipated liquidation values emerge as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504655
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails its sale. This Paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791603
We study the impact of different bankruptcy laws in general equilibrium, taking into account the interactions between the credit and labour markets, as well as wealth heterogeneity. Soft bankruptcy laws often preclude liquidation, to avoid ex-post inefficiencies. This worsens credit rationing,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498012
We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498123
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
We examine screening incentives, welfare and the case for mandatory skin-in-the-game. Ex ante banks can screen, using interim private information to choose retentions and structuring. Ex post speculators trade with rational hedging investors. Absent regulation, there is a separating equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024483
We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364996
This Paper analyses the effect of a possible takeover on information flows and on the terms of trade in business relationships. We consider a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately-informed stakeholder, a buyer for example. In our model, takeovers both increase the surplus from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662138