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Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden

Bergman, Mats; Johansson, Per; Lundberg, Sofia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084097

Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against Lobbies

Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

lobbying pressure are more likely than other firms to choose joint ventures as their corporate governance structure. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468544

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing … predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers …. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969

The Proper Scope of Governments When Costs are Contractible

Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership. Our starting point is the analysis of Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (HSV), who apply an incomplete contract framework to study the difference between private and public ownership. Our analysis departs from HSV’s model in two aspects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124030

Knowledge Creation and Control in Organizations

Puga, Diego; Trefler, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The incremental innovations that underlie much of modern economic growth typically involve changes to one or more components of a complex product. This creates a tension. On the one hand, a principal would like an agent to contribute innovative components. On the other hand, ironing out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124075

When Does Coordination Require Centralization?

Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multi-divisional organization in which decisions must be responsive to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124372

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067623

Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497777

Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest

Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871

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