We examine how a firm's changing environment and the information constraints of its managers interact as determinants of the size of the firm's administration. Following the recent decentralised information processing literature, we assume that it takes individual managers time to process...

This Paper presents theory and evidence on the relationship between inequality and institutional quality. We exhibit a model in which the two dynamically reinforce each other and set to test this relationship with a broad array of institutional measures. We establish the double causality between...

Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials'...

Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to...