In this paper we analyse the likely effects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on European unemployment. We start by describing the current unemployment situation in the European Union (EU). In so doing, we try to assess the relative importance of European, national and regional shocks in...

The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores possible motivations for...

In this paper we study the relationship between labour market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labour institutions (labour adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigidity) and social preferences...

Policy-makers’ incentives to undertake costly reform depends on the international monetary system. We consider the effect of monetary regimes on labour market reform. We find international negotiation of monetary policy produces less reform than non-cooperation. Reform is lowest of all with...

So far, the 'New Open Economy Macroeconomics' literature has primarily focused on monetary policy and monetary policy rules, rather than paying attention also to fiscal policy. This is an omission because, especially with the advent of EMU, the burden on fiscal policy as an instrument for...

We show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification. Moreover, by making sanctions contingent upon the economic situation of countries, the stability pact provides for risk sharing. Differences in...

This Paper analyses the decision of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of fiscal restraints similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. We provide suggestive evidence that structural reforms - in particular labour market reforms - may lead to...

This paper explores the interaction between centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy in a monetary union. Discretionary monetary policy suffers from a failure to commit. Moreover, decentralized fiscal policymakers impose externalities on each other through the influence of...

The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing in a fiscal union, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates...