We study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanims in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a...

We study how barriers to competition - such as, restrictions to business start-up and strict enforcement of covenants or IPR - affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. These barriers lower the competition for human capital and reduce the incentive to...

Inflation and financing of public expenditure by are analysed in an OLG model where the deficit is constrained to be less than a given fraction of intergenerational savings. Even if there may be multiplicity of steady-state equilibria, we show that, with such a constraint, the dynamics with...

We study the evolution of sectoral employment and labour cost in 11 European countries over the last two decades. Our statistical approach consists of decompositions for country, industry and temporal effects. Virtual economies are constructed by filtering country effects. We find that sectoral...

We study how competition from privately-supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if ‘inside monies’ can...

We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model where nominal debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium policy implies the progressive depletion of the outstanding stock of debt,...

We study the emplyment and distributional effects of regulating (reducing) working time in a general equilibrium model with search-matching frictions. Job creation entails some fixed costs, but existing jobs are subject to diminishing returns. We characterize the equilibrium in the de-regulated...

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output....

Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic increase in the size of the financial sector and in the compensation of financial executives. This increase has been associated with greater risk-taking and the use of more complex financial instruments. Parallel to this trend, the...

We develop and compute a dynamic equilibrium model where economies differ on the relative efficiency of financial intermediaries and, therefore on households portfolios and currency holdings. Our model economies have some of the features of the different financial structures in countries of the...