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Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217
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On Robust Constitution Design
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542
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The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set
Restrepo, Jorge; Spagat, Michael; Vargas, Juan F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We present a detailed, high-frequency dataset on the civil conflict in Colombia during the period 1988-2002. We briefly … pattern over time of conflict actions and intensity for all sides involved in the confrontation. We also describe the pattern …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662139
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Multi-Battle Contests
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791548
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Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124335
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Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War
Glick, Reuven; Taylor, Alan M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
Conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504411
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Distributional Conflict in Organisations
Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M; Wärneryd, Karl - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be … influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504716
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Delay in Contests
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Why is there delay in contests? In this Paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504736
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When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia
Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A; Torvik, Ragnar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656168
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War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict
Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is … beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals … after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003383