Acid rain is caused by sulphur dioxide (SO2), largely from power stations, and nitrogen oxides (NOx), half of which comes from vehicles. The paper attempts to quantify the costs and benefits of abatement in Europe, and concludes that the current agreement on uniform reductions from 1980 levels...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...

The determinants of the dramatically rising expenditures on health care in general, and on hospital care in particular, have been of prior concern to policy and to research. Using a rich panel data set this paper contributes to this literature by investigating factors determining the demand for...

We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria are admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a...

The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from non experimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a pro-competitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The...

Extending choice in health care is currently popular amongst English, and other, politicians. Those promoting choice make an appeal to a simple economic argument. Competitive pressure helps make private firms more efficient and consumer choice acts as a major driver for efficiency. Giving...

The Paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services. We assume that providers can increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort (upcoding or DRG creep). We derive and compare the optimal price and...

Waiting-time targets are frequently used by policy makers in the healthcare sector to monitor provider's performance. Such targets are based on the distribution of the patients on the list. We compare and link such distribution with the distribution of waiting time of the patients treated, as...