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Government Debt Threshold Contracts
Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
Politicians tend to push the amount of public debt beyond socially desirable levels in order to increase their reelection chances. We develop a model that provides a new explanation for this behavior: office holders undertake debt-financed public projects, but postpone the timing of part of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642889
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Higher Bars for Incumbents and Experience
Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When campaigning for election to an open seat in the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083310
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Vote-share Contracts and Democracy
Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791280
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Contractual Democracy
Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
Although they would yield social benefits, some political projects may not be implemented in democracies. Prominent examples are the reform of European labour markets, the reduction of government debt or the reduction of greenhouse gases. We suggest introducing political contracts to make...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656254
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Higher Vote Thresholds for Incumbents, Effort and Selection
Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025512
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Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?
Hunt, Jennifer; Laszlo, Sonia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114227
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Landownership Concentration and the Expansion of Education
Cinnirella, Francesco; Hornung, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
institutions. We find that landownership concentration, a proxy for the institution of serfdom, has a negative effect on schooling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084473
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Culture and Institutions
Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
How and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions? This paper … (as opposed to limited) morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non-despotic political institutions in the … distant past. Second, well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067364
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State Capacity and Military Conflict
Gennaioli, Nicola; Voth, Hans-Joachim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority, no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and multiple, overlapping levels of jurisdiction. By 1800, Europe had consolidated into a handful of powerful, centralized nation states. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385769
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Impure Prosocial Motivation in Charity Provision: Warm-Glow Charities and Implications for Public Funding
Scharf, Kimberley - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084073