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Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show LINGO

Beetsma, Roel; Schotman, Peter C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

We use data from a television game show, involving elementary lotteries and substantial prize money, as a natural experiment to measure risk attitudes. We find robust evidence of substantial risk aversion. As an extension, we esimate the various models using transformations of the ‘true’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661826

The Impact of 'Rollover' Contracts on Switching Costs in the UK Voice Market: Evidence from Disaggregate Customer Billing Data

Crawford, Gregory S; Tosini, Nicola; Waehrer, Keith - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In February 2008, British Telecommunications (BT) introduced automatically renewing, or ‘rollover’, contracts into the … UK market for fixed-voice telephone service. These contracts included a 12-month Minimum Contract Period (MCP) with … dataset, we measure the impact of rollover contracts on BT customers’ decision to switch to another provider. We find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385761

Monotone Matching In Perfect And Imperfect Worlds

Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123563

Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Dubois, Pierre; Jullien, Bruno; Magnac, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to … each other through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self-enforcing agreements specifying voluntary … to self-enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are used to reduce this probability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123633

Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier

Acemoglu, Daron; Aghion, Philippe; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123937

Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

Jullien, Bruno; Salanié, Bernard; Salanié, François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

information, so that the model also exhibits adverse selection. We characterize the optimal menu of contracts; while its detailed … contracts. We then apply our results to insurance, managerial incentive pay and corporate governance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067616

The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

Grossman, Sanford J; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1985

complete contracts. We define the firm as being composed of its assets. We present a theory of costly contracts which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497709

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

Chemla, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that tougher competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497922

Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

), the principal then responds by offering the agent a (possibly degenerate) menu of contracts that are payoff— equivalent …’s strategy to be Markov is without loss in the case of deterministic decisions, e.g. when the contracts are deterministic and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498138

Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the … contracts in order to screen the agent’s type. We provide a full characterization of the principal’s optimal menu. The results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504207