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On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas
Hilber, Christian A. L.; Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group via increasing property prices but hurt the latter via increasing development costs. In this setting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083410
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On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas
Hilber, Christian A. L.; Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group (via increasing property prices) but hurt the latter (via increasing development costs). More desirable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557007
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Investment and capital structure of partially private regulated firms
Cambini, Carlo; Spiegel, Yossi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209829
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Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence
Besley, Timothy J.; Coate, Stephen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662098
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Regulation and Access Pricing with Asymmetric Information
De Fraja, Gianni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
We study in this paper whether the price charged to a competitor for the use of an essential input produced in conditions of natural monopoly should reflect only considerations of relative efficiency between the various potential suppliers. In a model that captures the technological conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666686
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Natural Resources and Reforms
Amin, Mohammad; Djankov, Simeon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We use a sample of 133 countries to investigate the link between the abundance of natural resources and micro-economic reforms. Previous studies suggest that natural resource abundance gives rise to governments that are less accountable to the public, states that are oligarchic, and that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666720
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Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting
Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic Principal-Agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. Contrary to the case with constant types, the ex ante optimal contract may be renegotiation-proof even if types are highly correlated....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666998
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The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings: Lessons to be Learned from the US Residential Market for Natural Gas
Davis, Lucas W; Kilian, Lutz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
federal regulation. Several studies have measured the deadweight loss from the price ceilings that were imposed during this … analysis for the regulation of other markets. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous model of natural gas demand we …-2000, effectively doubling previous estimates of the total welfare losses from natural gas regulation. We find that these allocative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791833
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Optimal Sliding Scale Regulation: An Application to Regional Electricity Distribution in England and Wales
Hawdon, David; Hunt, Lester; Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper examines optimal price (i.e. ‘sliding scale’) regulation of a monopoly when efficiency and managerial effort … are not observed. We show how to operationalize this model of incentive regulation and use actual data from electricity … distribution in England and Wales to make welfare comparisons of sliding scale regulation with a price cap regime and the First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792004
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Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)
Harbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468563