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The Race for Polluting Permits
Brechet, Thierry; Peralta, Susana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666994
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Super-Additionality: A Neglected Force in Markets for Carbon Offsets
Bento, Antonio; Kanbur, Ravi; Leard, Benjamin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Climate change mitigation programs classify two types of carbon offsets: Additional and non-additional. Additional offsets are offsets that correspond to actual reductions in emissions. In contrast, non-additional offsets are offsets that do not correspond to emissions reductions. These offsets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083359
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Designing Carbon Taxation Schemes for Automobiles: A Simulation Exercise for Germany
Adamou, Adamos; Clerides, Sofronis; Zachariadis, Theodoros - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Vehicle taxation based on CO2 emissions is increasingly being adopted worldwide in order to shift consumer purchases to low-carbon cars, yet little is known about the effectiveness and overall economic impact of these schemes. We focus on feebate schemes, which impose a fee on high-carbon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084619
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Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
Basu, Arnab K; Chau, Nancy H; Kanbur, Ravi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Two stylized representations are often found in the academic and policy literature on informality and formality in developing countries. The first is that the informal (or unregulated) sector is more competitive than the formal (or regulated) sector. The second is that contract enforcement is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225957
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Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure
Aney, Madhav; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246601
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A Second Look at the Pesticides Initiative Program: Evidence from Senegal
Cadot, Olivier; Jaud, Mélise - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper investigates whether the Pesticides Initiative Program has significantly affected the export performance of Senegal's horticulture industry. We apply two main microeconometric techniques, difference-in-difference and matching difference-in-differences to identify the effect of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493562
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Private States and the Enforcement of Property Rights - Theory and Evidence on the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia
Bandiera, Oriana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia initially developed to protect land from predatory attacks, at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common-agency model, the Paper shows that: (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662056
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Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration
Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labour contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666428
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Political Predation and Economic Development
Azam, Jean-Paul; Bates, Robert H; Biais, Bruno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
Economic growth occurs as resources are reallocated from the traditional sector to the more productive modern sector. Yet, the latter is more vulnerable to political predation. Hence, political risk hinders development. We analyse a politico-economic game between citizens and governments, whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667096
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Land Distribution, Incentives and the Choice of Production Techniques in Nicaragua
Bandiera, Oriana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
The distribution of property rights has a strong impact on output when, due to the non-contractibility of some inputs …, market contracts do not yield efficient outcomes. In this Paper I analyse how the distribution of land rights affects the … technique might be inefficient, regardless of the distribution of property rights. The efficiency loss is, however, lower when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667105