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Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments

Casella, Alessandra - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

parameterizations studied. The theoretical conclusions are tested through laboratory experiments. Subjects have difficulty identifying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123593

Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788900

Bundling and the Unanimity Rule

Erlenmaier, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791780

Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity

Desmet, Klaus; Le Breton, Michel; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heterogeneous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136479

Knowing What Works. The Case for Rigorous Programme Evaluation

Schmidt, Christoph M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

problem. It introduces several approaches, based on both experiments and on non-experimental data that have been proposed in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788972

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114195

Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving

Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084285

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656392

Did We Overestimate the Role of Social Preferences? The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples

Falk, Armin; Meier, Stephan; Zehnder, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

phenomena. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self …-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically … experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Our first study shows that students who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642878

Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095

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