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Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation

Fiocco, Raffaele; Strausz, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083936

The Customs Union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?

Facchini, Giovanni; Silva, Peri; Willmann, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully fledged customs unions. This paper develops a political economy model of trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084061

Backwards Integration and Strategic Delegation

Hunold, Matthias; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We analyze the effects of one or more downstream firms’ acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when firms compete in prices in both markets. With such an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on that supplier’s and thus, their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084651

Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies a model of public policy with heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) is chosen directly by an elected policy-maker, and the other (pollution) depends stochastically on the amount of roads. Both a one-country and a two-country version of the model are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124334

Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Conconi, Paola; Facchini, Giovanni; Zanardi, Maurizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667066

Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745

Anatomy of Cartel Contracts

Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of … organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization …. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084010

On discrimination in procurement auctions

Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

With exogenous participation, strong bidders should be discriminated against weak bidders to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When participation is endogenous and the set of potential entrants is large, optimal discrimination if any takes a very different form. Without incumbents, there should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084599

Trust and Deterrence

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084601

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790