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In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of … subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002
We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
The Markowitz mean-variance optimizing framework has served as the basis for modern portfolio theory for more than 50 years. However, efforts to translate this theoretical foundation into a viable portfolio construction algorithm have been plagued by technical difficulties stemming from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504227
We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508
The centrality of an agent in a network has been shown to be crucial in explaining different behaviors and outcomes. In this paper, we propose an axiomatic approach to characterize a class of centrality measures for which the centrality of an agent is recursively related to the centralities of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083213
In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings between pairs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789066
This Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791506
games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner …'s dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797
Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791850
This Paper considers the efficiency and convergence properties of dynamic processes of social and economic interactions, such as exchange economies, multilateral negotiations, merger and divestiture transactions, or legislative bargaining. The key general feature of the economy is that agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792299