Using panel data from an unique survey of public primary schools in Uganda we assess the degree of leakage of public funds in education. The survey data reveal that on average, during the period 1991-95, schools received only 13% of what the central government contributed to the schools’...

This Paper uses a large new panel data set to examine the relationship between elections and fiscal policy. We find clear evidence of political business cycles in macroeconomic policy: spending increases before elections while revenues fall, leading to a larger deficit in election years. We also...

This Paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features: not all firms report they need to pay bribes; and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar...

What is the most effective way to increase primary school enrolment and student learning? We argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption. We examine...

Strengthening the relationship of accountability between health service providers and citizens is by many people viewed as critical for improving access to and quality of health care. How this is to be achieved, and whether it works, however, remain open questions. This paper presents a...

Counterfeit and sub-standard antimalarial drugs present a growing threat to public health. This paper investigates the mechanisms that determine the prevalence of fake antimalarial drugs in local markets, their effects, and potential interventions to combat the problem. We collect drug samples...

This Paper exploits a unique micro-level data set on primary health care facilities in Uganda to address the question: What motivates religious not-for-profit (RNFP) health care providers? We use two approaches to identify whether an altruistic (religious) effect exists in the data. First,...

Why are firms more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats to bend the rules in developing countries while they instead lobby the government to change the rules in more developed ones? Should we expect an evolution from bribing to lobbying, or can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium...