We analyse how a firm allocates information rights across its multiple banks. By differentiating information disclosed, a firm prevents its banks from continuing projects (possibly unsound) solely in order to use their superior information and seize assets during the reorganization....

We study the role of contract enforcement in shaping the dynamics of international trade at the firm level. We develop a theoretical model to describe how agents build reputations to overcome the problems created by weak enforcement of international contracts. We find that, all else equal,...

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. We show that while the possibility of waiting longer for others'’ actions helps agents to coordinate in the good equilibrium, the option of delaying one’s' actions harms...

Fundamental models of money always exhibit autarkic equilibria where money has no value. In this paper we propose a simple procedure to select among equilibria in such models. Our procedure unveils a natural mapping between equilibrium behavior and the primitives of the economy, thus offering...