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A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644035
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On the Selection of Arbitrators
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707
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Arbitration in International Trade
Casella, Alessandra - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992
The great majority of international contracts provide for arbitration in the event of dispute. Legal scholars argue … that international arbitration is causing the development of a legal doctrine attuned to the needs of business and … independent of national laws. This paper studies international arbitration as a prime example of private trade shaping …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504547
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Random Walk Expectations and the Forward Discount Puzzle
Bacchetta, Philippe; van Wincoop, Eric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Two well-known, but seemingly contradictory, features of exchange rates are that they are close to a random walk while at the same time exchange rate changes are predictable by interest rate differentials. In this paper we investigate whether these two features of the data may in fact be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789185
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Macroeconomic Policy Design with Incomplete Information: A New Argument for Coordinating Economic Policies
Hughes Hallett, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1987
The harshest criticism of econometrically based policy evaluation is undoubtedly the sensitivity of its conclusions to assumptions concerning the information available to policy-makers or to misspecification of the econometric models used in the evaluation. Economists appear to have accepted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791857
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Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning versus Re-election Concerns
Le Borgne, Eric; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between officeholder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the officeholder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792465
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Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations
Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124138
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Efficient Tuition & Fees, Examinations and Subsidies
Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
A student's future log-wage is given by the sum of a skill premium and a random personal ‘ability’ term. Students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. We assume first that universities are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136530
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To Reveal or Not to Reveal - The Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
Rosenkranz, Stephanie - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
Firms' incentives to form research joint ventures (RJVs) are analysed in an incomplete information framework when technological know-how is private information. Firms first decide on cooperation and information revelation and then compete for a patent. Provided that spillovers exist in the case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504335
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The Informational Role of the Business Cycle
Dellas, Harris - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Economic decisions such as occupational and entrepreneurial choices may violate true comparative advantage when economic agents are uncertain about which activity best matches their talents. If relative performance varies over the business cycle (for instance, if downturns affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504434