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Umbrella Branding and External Certification
Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality … external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on … the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661499
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The Ownership of Ratings
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Peyrache, Eloïc; Quesada, Lucía - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
uncertain of their quality at the time of hiring a certification intermediary and if the decision to get a rating is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067394
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Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts markets, where the expert observes the intervention that a consumer needs to fix his problem and also provides a treatment, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480
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Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis effort induces experts to use their tariffs as signaling devices. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792449
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On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
In recent years various contributions have analyzed the credence goods problem under a wide variety of assumptions yielding equilibria exhibiting various degrees of inefficiencies and fraud. The variety of results has fostered the impression that the equilibrium behaviour of experts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194
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The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments
Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in general training when labour markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in specific training...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666647
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Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions
Patton, Andrew J; Ramadorai, Tarun; Streatfield, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We analyze the reliability of voluntary disclosures of financial information, focusing on widely-employed publicly available hedge fund databases. Tracking changes to statements of historical performance recorded at different points in time between 2007 and 2011, we find that historical returns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084298
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Intermediaries as Bundlers, Traders and Quality Assessors: The Case of UK Tour Operators
Clerides, Sofronis; Nearchou, Paris; Pashardes, Panos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study the intermediary role of tour operators in the market for package tourism. Intermediaries often arise in order to facilitate trade in markets characterized by asymmetric information. In the travel industry policy-makers have tried to address information asymmetries by providing hotel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124410
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Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449
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Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084544