Showing 1 - 10 of 257
endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … appears to increase collusion by allowing for an inexpensive and highly effective form of punishment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095
This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083533
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134
A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the problems with current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136615
information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083588
Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661429
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831